



Beyond Leveraged Losses: The Balance
Sheet Effects of the Home Price Downturn
ABSTRACT This paper quantiﬁes the impact of declining home prices,
increasing mortgage credit losses, and the associated reduction in credit supply
on real GDP growth. Using a state-level panel analysis, I ﬁrst estimate the link
between home prices and foreclosures. I estimate that an additional 15 percent
home price decline from mid-2008 levels would be consistent with total
residential mortgage credit losses over 2007–12 of $750 billion, although
the uncertainty is high. I then gauge the impact of such losses on the supply
of credit from banks, asset-backed security markets, and the government-
sponsored enterprises, and in turn on real GDP growth. In the central scenario,
the crisis could lower real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009 by an average of
2.6 percentage points per year. This estimate excludes both adverse multiplier
effects (labor market deterioration, global trade repercussions, and credit quality
feedback) and policy offsets.
T
he current housing market downturn weighs on the economy in four
main ways. First, the sharp decline in residential construction activity
reduces aggregate output directly. From the fourth quarter of 2005 to the
third quarter of 2008, declining real residential investment subtracted a
cumulative total of 2.5 percentage points from real GDP growth.
Second, declining income in the housing sector in turn has effects on
other parts of the economy. Laid-off construction workers and real estate
agents cut back on consumer spending, homebuilders (and their subcon-
tractors) invest less in construction equipment, and nonresidential con-
struction ﬁrms see less demand for new commercial development. These
second-round effects are harder to quantify because they are so spread out
through the economy, but they are likely to be signiﬁcant as well.
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through either a negative wealth effect or a mortgage liquidity effect, or
both. Households who spent more than they earned during the boom by
borrowing against the rising value of their home may be forced to cut back.
Even households who did not outspend their income might reduce their
consumption in response to a decline in their wealth or their permanent
income, or both. Most studies analyzing this issue ﬁnd evidence for a hous-
ing wealth effect, but its size varies widely depending on the time period
and the empirical design.
1
Fourth, losses on mortgage credit deplete the equity capital of lever-
aged ﬁnancial institutions and persuade them to reduce their ﬁnancial
leverage. This reduces the supply of credit to households and nonﬁnancial
businesses. David Greenlaw, Hatzius, Anil Kashyap, and Hyun Song Shin
(henceforth GHKS) ﬁnd that an assumed $500 billion in aggregate mort-
gage credit losses could cut real GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points over
a year’s time.
2
This paper focuses on the fourth channel. Building on the study by
GHKS, its main contributions are a more detailed empirical analysis of
the link between home price declines and mortgage credit losses and a
more systematic look at the role of the asset-backed security (ABS) mar-
kets. The ﬁrst section analyzes the links between home prices and fore-
closures, and ultimately between home prices and mortgage credit losses,
using a state-level panel dataset for the period 1998–2008 to predict fore-
closures. The second section discusses the impact of mortgage credit
losses on the supply of credit to private nonﬁnancial borrowers, with a
particular focus on on-balance-sheet lending by banks and other lever-
aged ﬁnancial institutions, off-balance-sheet lending through the ABS
markets, and lending backed by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The third section discusses the
potential impact on economic activity, using an instrumental variables
approach to estimate the link between credit supply and real GDP growth.
The fourth section concludes.
The Link between Home Prices and Credit Losses
The underlying cause of the recent ﬁnancial crisis is the decline in home
prices and the associated increase in foreclosures and credit losses. Fig-
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1. For an overview, see Muellbauer (2007).
2. Greenlaw and others (2008).
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two most widely used measures, the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Index
and the purchase-only OFHEO index, seasonally adjusted, constructed by
the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. As of the second quar-
ter of 2008, home prices on a year-on-year basis were down 15.4 percent




3. The large difference between the two indexes is due to three main factors. First, the
Case-Shiller index is weighted by market capitalization, whereas the OFHEO index is
weighted by the number of households. This means that the Case-Shiller index gives more
weight to regions with high average home values, in particular the coasts, which generally
have seen larger home price swings. Second, the Case-Shiller index includes all home
transactions, whereas the OFHEO index includes only transactions involving conforming
mortgages. This means that the OFHEO index has missed the direct effects of the subprime
mortgage boom and likely understates the rate of home price decline in the broad housing
market. Third, the Case-Shiller index covers only 70 percent of the United States (by mar-
ket value), whereas the OFHEO index has near-complete geographic coverage. Since the
regions excluded by the Case-Shiller index are generally rural and relatively stable, the
Case-Shiller index likely overstates the rate of home price decline in the broad housing
market.
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Standard & Poor’s, Fiserv, and MacroMarkets.
Percent change from one year before
S&P/Case-Shiller home price index
OFHEO house price index
(purchase only)
–12







Figure 1. Two Measures of the Decline in Home Prices, 1992–2008
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The key question this section of the paper asks is how large an aggre-
gate mortgage credit loss will result from the decline in home prices. Ana-
lysts have attempted to answer this question in three main ways. First,
some have estimated “market-implied” losses from indexes such as the
ABX.HE index of prices of subprime credit derivatives.
4 But although
such an estimate of market-implied losses is useful for gauging how much
principal ﬁnancial institutions that mark to market will need to write down
in the near term, there is no particular reason to think that it will prove to
be an accurate gauge of ultimate credit losses. Indeed, if analysts were
to use market prices to forecast credit losses, and the market then relied on
these forecasts to price assets, the cat would be chasing its own tail.
Second, many applied mortgage credit analysts use detailed vintage-by-
vintage data to estimate credit losses by projecting forward historical
delinquency, default, and loss curves. Here the key assumption is that
although different mortgage vintages (a vintage is the set of mortgages ini-
tiated in a given year) have different default trajectories, the relative pro-
gression through time is stable, or at least highly predictable. For example,
suppose that the cumulative default rate of the 2006 subprime vintage is 
3 percent at the end of 2007. Suppose further that the 2004 vintage showed
a cumulative default rate of 1 percent after one year and 4 percent after
three years, for a fourfold increase over two years. In that case the model
implies that the 2006 vintage should show a 12 percent default rate by
2009. The problem with this approach should be readily apparent,
namely, that within-vintage patterns are unlikely to remain stable as one
goes from a rising to a falling home price environment. At a minimum, one
should adjust the curves for falling home prices, but this is difﬁcult to do
because the detailed data required for building these vintage-by-vintage
models are available only back to the late 1990s, a period without a
national housing downturn until very recently.
Third, one can use historical relationships among defaults, home prices,
and perhaps other economic variables to estimate future default rates. For
example, Adrian Blundell-Wignall estimates an equation that explains
the subprime delinquency rate by GDP, home prices, and unemployment,
using data from 1998 to 2007.
5 He then uses the resulting equation, along
with assumptions about the relationships among delinquencies, defaults,
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
4. For example, Blundell-Wignall (2008), GHKS (2008), and Bank of England (2008).
5. Blundell-Wignall (2008).
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and losses and trends in the explanatory variables, to forecast credit losses.
The problem with this approach is that the underlying dataset is confined
to 40 aggregate observations during a period that, again, saw no housing
downturn except at the very end.
A State-Level Approach
Given these limitations, it is more promising to use disaggregated
region-by-region information that includes at least some periods of
declining home prices in each region to estimate the relationship between
home prices and mortgage credit performance. For example, GHKS look
at foreclosure data from the Texas, California, and Massachusetts housing
downturns of the 1980s and 1990s to gauge what a signiﬁcant nominal
home price downturn could mean for foreclosures. Nominal home price
declines in these episodes of 10 to 15 percent resulted in a tripling of the
rate of foreclosure starts over a two-to-six-year period, with only a grad-
ual decline thereafter. Extrapolating this observation to the post-2007
national housing market, and making assumptions about the percentage
of foreclosure starts that result in repossessions and about average “sever-
ity” (the size of the loss associated with a default), GHKS argue that the
regional precedents may be consistent with total losses of around $500 bil-
lion in the current episode.
However, this region-by-region approach is also subject to several
limitations. One could argue, on the one hand, that it is too pessimistic,
because the rise in foreclosures in the three regional downturns was
undoubtedly partly due to the massive labor market deterioration recorded
in all three cases. From the start of the downturn, the unemployment rate
rose by a cumulative 3.3 percentage points in Texas, 4.8 percentage points
in California, and as much as 6.0 percentage points in Massachusetts. For
comparison, the biggest national increase in the postwar period totaled
4.4 percentage points, seen in the 1973–75 recession. Although the national
labor market is clearly deteriorating quite sharply at present, using such a
large decline as the baseline assumption may be too extreme.
On the other hand, one could argue that the region-by-region approach
delivers overly optimistic results, because it cannot take account of the far-
reaching structural changes in the housing and mortgage markets that have
occurred since these regional episodes. In particular, the subprime mort-
gage market barely existed before the mid-1990s. Since a large share of the
current problem is concentrated in the subprime market, this might suggest
that the current downturn may be more severe. The behavior of mortgage
borrowers may also have changed. As recently as the early 1990s, it seems
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ended up defaulting on their mortgage debt. For example, Christopher
Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen show that only 6.4 percent of
Massachusetts homeowners who were estimated to be in negative equity at
the end of 1991 defaulted over the next three years.
6 Now, however, anec-
dotal reports, at least, suggest that a signiﬁcant number of borrowers walk
away from their mortgage once they are in negative equity. This could
imply that the impact of home price declines on defaults will be larger in
the current national episode than in the three regional downturns.
The model presented in this paper instead uses more recent state-level
information to estimate the link between home prices and foreclosures, and
ultimately between home prices and credit losses. I use quarterly panel
data from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) for all 50 states and
the District of Columbia over the period 1998Q1–2008Q2 to estimate
the relationship between the logarithm of the state foreclosure rate and
changes in nominal state home prices as measured by the purchase-only
OFHEO index.
7 I estimate separate equations for prime adjustable-rate,
prime ﬁxed-rate, subprime adjustable-rate, and subprime ﬁxed-rate loans
and include state and time ﬁxed effects as well as three lags of the depen-
dent variable.
8
I then use these equations to project state-level foreclosure rates for
each type of mortgage for a given home price path and combine these
projections with assumptions about the estimated foreclosure completion
rate and mortgage loss severity to calculate a path for total mortgage
credit losses. Finally, by summing up these period-by-period losses over
2007–12, I obtain a rough estimate of total credit losses on the currently
outstanding stock of residential mortgage debt.
This approach has some important advantages compared with previ-
ous analyses. First, when combined with assumptions about foreclosure
completions and severities, it allows the implications for foreclosures of
a given change in the home price outlook to be estimated using a very
simple and transparent method. Other approaches, including the regional
approach of GHKS, do not allow such a calculation.
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
6. Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008b).
7. Unfortunately, the Case-Shiller home price index is not available at the state level.
The purchase-only OFHEO index is generally viewed as the most reliable state-level home
price measure.
8. It is well known that a simple ﬁxed effects estimator leads to downwardly biased
coefﬁcient estimates on the lagged dependent variable. However, the results in Judson and
Owen (1997) suggest that the bias should be very small given the dimensions of the panel,
which covers all 50 states and the District of Columbia and 42 periods.
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tion to bear on the problem. Depending on the speciﬁcation, almost 2,000
observations are available on the link between changes in home prices and
foreclosures at the state level. This is especially noteworthy because the
panel structure of the dataset ensures that the large sample does not include
old data from periods when the behavior of borrowers and lenders may
have been very different, such as the early-1990s downturn.
Third, this approach models foreclosures for different types of mort-
gages and can therefore take into account potential differences in the per-
formance of subprime versus prime mortgages, and adjustable-rate (ARM)
versus ﬁxed-rate (FRM) mortgages.
9 Subprime borrowers are more vulner-
able to default than prime borrowers, both because they tend to be ﬁnan-
cially weaker and because they have, in recent years, often taken out
mortgages with higher loan-to-value ratios in particularly “frothy” parts of
the country.
This analysis also has some clear limitations. First, and most important,
it extrapolates a fairly recent event—the unprecedented downturn in mort-
gage credit quality that started in late 2006 or early 2007—into uncharted
territory. Despite the large number of observations, it would be optimistic
to believe that the analysis will reveal stable (let alone “structural”) rela-
tionships between home prices and foreclosures. At best one can hope to
provide an order-of-magnitude estimate of the likely amount of mortgage
credit losses assuming a particular outcome for home prices.
Second, because the analysis is reduced-form in nature, one cannot be
sure about the causal relationship between home prices and foreclosures.
Although Foote and his coauthors argue persuasively that home prices have
a bigger impact on foreclosures than foreclosures have on home prices,
the arrows of causation surely run in both directions.
10 A good instrument
for state-level home prices that might settle this issue is unavailable. How-
ever, this does not appear to be a serious problem, because much of the
interest in the link between home prices and mortgage credit losses is of a
“reduced-form” variety. That is, one would like to know what mortgage
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9. The distinction between prime and subprime is not entirely clean. Participants who
service both prime and subprime loans report the results of each separately for maximum
precision in the classiﬁcation. However, the prime sample contains some subprime loans, and
the subprime sample some prime loans. Also, there is no separate category for so-called alt-
A mortgages, which are loans to borrowers with high credit scores that are lower in quality
on other metrics such as income documentation or loan-to-value ratios. My understanding is
that alt-A loans are largely included in the “prime” sample.
10. Foote and others (2008a).
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present analysis does provide an answer to this question.
Third, because the foreclosure data used here do not pertain to specific
mortgage vintages, one cannot control directly for the effects of good
versus bad underwriting standards in particular vintages, nor can one pre-
cisely estimate foreclosures on the currently outstanding stock of mort-
gages. The approach could lead to a higher or a lower number than a true
“lifetime loss” analysis, depending on whether the losses on mortgages
that have yet to be originated but will be realized in the 2008–12 period are
greater or smaller than the losses on mortgages that have already been
originated but will not be realized until after 2012. I suspect that the differ-
ence between these two numbers—whether positive or negative—is small
relative to the range of potential estimates, but there is no way to be sure.
Estimates of the Impact of Home Price Changes on Foreclosures
The odd-numbered columns in table 1 report my baseline estimates of
the effects of changes in home prices on foreclosures for subprime ARMs,
subprime FRMs, prime ARMs, and prime FRMs. All equations include
both state and time dummies. Although time dummies pose some prob-
lems for projection purposes, as it is difﬁcult to be sure what number to use
for future periods (see the discussion below), I found that equations with-
out time dummies resulted in a signiﬁcant overprediction of foreclosures
in some of the boom-bust states toward the very end of the sample period.
This problem was particularly severe for subprime ARMs. When time
dummies are included, the overprediction problem is reduced signiﬁcantly.
One potential explanation is that part of the deterioration in the 2006–07
period reﬂects poor underwriting standards and mortgage fraud in the 2006
and 2007 vintages rather than the impact of home price declines per se. A
speciﬁcation without time dummies will miss such vintage effects. It will
attribute all of the deterioration to the home price decline and therefore
predict a closer relationship between home price declines and foreclosures
than is appropriate if there are indeed important vintage effects.
The upshot of these results is that the link between home price changes
and foreclosures is very close. For all four types of mortgages, the rela-
tionship is highly signiﬁcant, with coefﬁcients that sum to between −8.4
and −10.8. If the lagged dependent variables are ignored, this means that a
1 percent drop in home prices is associated with an 8.4 to 10.8 percent
increase in foreclosures. Moreover, there is substantial persistence in all
four equations, with coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent variables that
sum to between 0.49 and 0.76. In general, the equations show that prime
202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-04_Hatzius_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:29 PM  Page 202JAN HATZIUS 203
and subprime mortgage foreclosures are quite similar in terms of their
links with home prices. The level of foreclosure starts is much higher for
subprime loans, and particularly for subprime ARMs, but the elasticity
with respect to home prices is not too different. In fact, if anything the elas-
ticity of foreclosure starts to home price declines is slightly higher in the
prime market than in the subprime market.
These baseline estimates do not include state-speciﬁc economic vari-
ables such as the state unemployment rate.
11 I found little evidence that
state unemployment rates have signiﬁcant predictive power with respect
to foreclosures, at least once the model includes the home price and the
lagged dependent variable terms. This is illustrated in the regressions
reported in the even-numbered columns in table 1, which add the current
state unemployment rate and three lags to the baseline speciﬁcations. In all
four cases the coefﬁcients sum to around zero, with negative coefﬁcients
on the current unemployment rate and positive coefﬁcients (in three of the
four estimates) on the thrice-lagged unemployment rate. Taking this result
seriously would imply that a rising unemployment rate was associated
with fewer foreclosures. However, the effect is extremely small. For exam-
ple, the equation for subprime ARMs implies that a 1-percentage-point
increase in the unemployment rate—a very large move on a quarter-to-
quarter basis—lowers foreclosure starts by just 3 percent (logarithmically).
Hence, in what follows I ignore the unemployment rate and instead use the
baseline results (the odd-numbered columns) to project alternative paths
for overall mortgage credit losses for given home price paths. To be able to
do this, one needs to make a number of assumptions, which I now discuss
in turn.
Projecting Foreclosure Starts
To use the model to project foreclosure starts, one needs to choose
assumptions for the explanatory variables, namely, state home prices and
the time dummies. Regarding state home prices, I choose three paths that
are each statistically consistent with one of the following assumptions: a
further 5 percent (logarithmic) decline in nominal home prices from
their 2008Q2 level, a further 15 percent decline, and a further 25 percent
decline, all through the middle of 2009 and measured by the national
Case-Shiller index. To translate these national-level home price assump-
tions to the state level, I use the predicted values from 51 simple regres-
11. National-level variables such as mortgage rates cannot be included because of the
time ﬁxed effects.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-04_Hatzius_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:29 PM  Page 205sions (results not reported) of the quarter-to-quarter change in the regional
purchase-only OFHEO index on the change in the national Case-Shiller
index (both seasonally adjusted using the Census X-12 algorithm). This
allows alternative expectations for national home prices, expressed in
terms of the Case-Shiller index, to be translated into corresponding assump-
tions about state-level prices, which are available only from OFHEO. As
one might expect, states with volatile housing markets, such as California
and Florida, show much greater sensitivity to changes in national home
prices than do states with more stable housing markets, such as Iowa and
Missouri.
12
I set the time dummies to zero, which indicates that the time effect is
assumed equal to the average of the sample period, under the assumption
that the positive time dummies in the 2006–07 period reﬂect vintage
effects resulting from poor underwriting or mortgage fraud, and that these
poorly underwritten or fraudulent mortgages have now largely defaulted.
This is an important and relatively optimistic assumption, since the time
dummies have been mostly positive in recent quarters.
13 Finally, to esti-
mate the absolute number of foreclosure starts, I multiply all foreclosure
rates by the number of mortgages serviced for each state and mortgage
type, adjusted for the rising coverage of the MBA sample.
14
Figure 2 shows actual foreclosure starts since the beginning of 2007
along with my projections through 2012, assuming a further 15 percent
home price decline (my central scenario). The model predicts that fore-
closure starts will peak at around 530,000 (not annualized) in the fourth
quarter of 2008 before gradually falling back toward the levels seen in
early 2007 (around 200,000). In total, the model predicts 8.3 million
foreclosure starts from early 2007 to late 2012, with projected shares of
37 percent for subprime ARMs, 16 percent for subprime FRMs, 21 percent
for prime ARMs, and 26 percent for prime FRMs.
206 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
12. Moreover, the predicted values for the national purchase-only OFHEO index that
result from aggregating the 51 state predictions are very close to the actual national series,
with an R
2 of 85 percent.
13. If one instead set the time dummies equal to the values estimated for 2008Q2, the
projected foreclosure rates would be 15 percent higher for subprime ARMs, 21 percent
higher for prime ARMs, 8 percent higher for subprime FRMs, and 15 percent higher for
prime FRMs.
14. The total number of mortgages serviced in the MBA dataset as a share of all ﬁrst-
lien home mortgages outstanding according to the American Housing Survey has risen from
57 percent in 1998 to 88 percent in 2008.
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The MBA data pertain to foreclosure starts rather than credit losses.
Hence, to estimate the latter, one needs to make assumptions about the
share of foreclosure starts that result in a loss to the lender, whether
through seizure of a home (the “foreclosure completion rate”) or not, and
about the average size (“severity”) of that loss.
Regarding the first issue, the question is what happens to borrowers
against whom a foreclosure notice has been filed. In theory, there are a
number of possibilities. They could again become current on their mort-
gage of their own volition (which implies no loss to the lender), lose
their home in a sheriff’s auction (a large loss to the lender), agree to a
“short sale” in which the lender accepts the proceeds even though it falls
short of the mortgage balance (usually a somewhat smaller loss), or
agree to a repayment plan that may involve some debt forgiveness (an
even smaller loss).
Unfortunately, no hard data are available on the relative frequencies of
these ultimate outcomes. However, there is good reason to believe that a
large proportion of the foreclosures started over the next couple of years
JAN HATZIUS 207













Figure 2. Projected Foreclosure Starts Assuming a Further 15 Percent Home Price
Decline, by Mortgage Type, 2007–2012
11472-04_Hatzius_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:29 PM  Page 207will result in a significant cost to the lender, in most cases a sheriff’s
auction. This is partly for a priori reasons. Presumably, negative equity
sharply decreases a homeowner’s incentive to become current on the mort-
gage, which would suggest that the percentage of foreclosure starts that
result in a cost to the lender will increase as home prices decline. Indeed,
this is largely conﬁrmed by data from Hope Now on recent foreclosure
starts and sales in states that have already seen large-scale home price
declines for several quarters, and where the impact of negative equity on
borrower behavior should therefore be most readily apparent.
15 Table 2
shows that in three of these states (California, Arizona, and Nevada) the
number of foreclosure sales is currently running about even with the num-
ber of foreclosure starts two quarters earlier. Given the usual foreclosure
timeline, this suggests that the vast majority of foreclosure starts currently
result in sheriff’s auctions in these states. The exception to this pattern
is Florida, where foreclosure sales are running at only about one-third
the level of foreclosure starts two quarters earlier. However, Florida is 
a “judicial” state, where lenders need to obtain a court order to proceed
with the foreclosure, and a serious logjam in processing foreclosures in
the Florida court system has been widely reported. If this is so, most of
the foreclosures currently started may still end up resulting in foreclosure
sales, but the lag would be too long for this to show up in the foreclosure
sales data in the near term.
Moreover, a longer perspective for the state of California confirms
that the percentage of foreclosure starts that result in sales closely tracks
208 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
15. Hope Now is a coalition of mortgage servicers and other market participants that
have committed themselves to preventing foreclosures in cooperation with the Treasury
Department.
Table 2. Foreclosure Starts and Sales of Foreclosed Homes in Four States, 2007–08
California Florida Arizona Nevada
Quarter Starts Sales Starts Sales Starts Sales Starts Sales
2007Q1 28,656 7,417 18,690 2,527 4,342 1,034 3,499 979
2007Q2 32,572 10,967 21,735 3,435 5,364 1,397 4,258 1,395
2007Q3 47,119 15,533 32,285 5,110 6,992 2,362 4,708 1,781
2007Q4 52,348 22,348 42,639 6,200 9,260 3,494 6,807 2,740
2008Q1 81,684 36,581 58,496 9,780 14,646 6,290 9,434 4,489
2008Q2 99,125 56,953 72,418 14,788 19,164 10,273 12,241 7,163
Source: Hope Now, “July State Data 2008.”
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information company DataQuick has produced a quarterly time series on
foreclosure starts (notices of default) and foreclosure sales (trustee deeds)
for California since 1992 (ﬁgure 3).
16 In the downturn of the early to mid-
1990s, when nominal home prices fell moderately, a sizable proportion
of foreclosure starts turned into foreclosure sales. During the California
real estate boom that started in the late 1990s, hardly any foreclosure
starts turned into sales. Finally, in the home price plunge of the past 12 to
18 months, foreclosure sales have climbed essentially in lockstep with
foreclosure starts one to two quarters earlier, conﬁrming that a very large
proportion of all new foreclosure starts now result in sales.
These observations suggest that a very large proportion of foreclosure
starts in the current cycle will involve a signiﬁcant loss to the lender, in
most cases because a foreclosure start is followed by an eventual sheriff’s
auction. Moreover, the data suggest that loss incidence shows a strong
JAN HATZIUS 209
16. The absolute numbers are higher than those in table 2 because the DataQuick ﬁgures
are a universe count whereas the Hope Now ﬁgures are based on a sample of servicers. How-
ever, the changes over time are quite similar for the (short) period during which both series
overlap.
Source: DataQuick Information Systems.
Thousands
Foreclosure sales (trustee deeds)
Foreclosure starts (notices of default)
20





Figure 3. California: Foreclosure Starts and Sales of Foreclosed Homes, 1992–2008
11472-04_Hatzius_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:29 PM  Page 209inverse relationship with changes in home prices. Unfortunately, this rela-
tionship cannot be estimated empirically from available data. Instead I
assume a foreclosure completion rate of 75 percent if home prices drop
another 5 percent from mid-2008 levels, 85 percent if prices drop another
15 percent, and 95 percent if prices drop another 25 percent.
17
The predicted number of foreclosures must also be converted into dollar
losses. Since the MBA foreclosure data are based on the number rather
than the dollar value of loans, this requires making an assumption about
the average mortgage balance by state. To do this, I use data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the average balances of subprime
and alt-A loans by state. I assume that the typical foreclosure in the 
MBA categories “subprime ARMs” and “subprime FRMs” involves an
average-sized subprime loan, and that the typical foreclosure in the MBA
categories “prime ARMs” and “prime FRMs” is an average-sized alt-A
loan.
18
The only remaining issue is what to assume for average severity. Sever-
ity depends inversely on home prices because a larger home price decline
implies that the typical foreclosed home is more deeply in negative equity.
Like the foreclosure completion rate, however, the relationship between
home prices and severities cannot be estimated statistically from available
data. Instead I assume that—depending on the home price outcome—
severities vary between 58 and 68 percent for subprime mortgages and
between 39 and 45 percent for prime and alt-A mortgages.
19
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17. One can loosely justify these assumptions by cross-sectionally correlating the
2008Q2 foreclosure completion rate from the Hope Now data (estimated using the ratio of
foreclosure sales to foreclosure starts two quarters earlier) with the cumulative home price
change from 2006Q2 to 2008Q2. An ordinary least squares regression with 51 observations
yields a slope coefﬁcient of −1.35 (with a t statistic of −5.6), meaning that an incremental
10-percentage-point home price drop implies an incremental 13.5-percentage-point rise in
the foreclosure completion rate.
18. This is a relatively conservative assumption. The MBA subprime sample includes at
least a small number of alt-A loans (which are generally larger than subprime loans), and the
MBA prime sample includes most jumbo loans (which are generally larger than alt-A loans).
Moreover, it is likely that the average foreclosure involves a larger-than-average mortgage
balance, since an excessive amount of debt presumably is a key reason the borrower experi-
enced problems in the ﬁrst place.
19. This assumption is qualitatively consistent with the methodology of Standard &
Poor’s (2008), whose severity assumptions depend directly on the decline in home prices.
A sampling of recent severity estimates for different mortgage types shows that Standard &
Poor’s (2008) assumes prime jumbo, alt-A, and subprime severities of 30, 40, and 50 per-
cent, respectively; Freddie Mac (2008) assumes average alt-A severities of 45 percent; and
Goldman Sachs (2007) assumes subprime severities of 60 percent.
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I use the above assumptions to project total credit losses for three alterna-
tive price scenarios, as reported in the top panel of table 3. If nominal home
prices fall another 5 percent before reverting to the previous trend, in which
prices rose by an average of 3 percent a year, the model implies that mortgage
JAN HATZIUS 211
Table 3. Projected Mortgage Credit Losses by Quarter and by Mortgage Type under
Three Home Price Scenarios, 2007–12
Billions of dollars
Loss assuming indicated decline in 
Period or type
home prices from mid-2008 level
of mortgage 5 percent 15 percent 25 percent
By quarter
2007Q1 5 5 5
2007Q2 8 8 8
2007Q3 13 13 13
2007Q4 19 19 19
2008Q1 27 27 27
2008Q2 37 37 37
2008Q3 43 48 53
2008Q4 44 52 72
2009Q1 38 54 91
2009Q2 34 52 107
2009Q3 30 50 102
2009Q4 27 49 82
2010Q1 24 44 60
2010Q2 22 39 47
2010Q3 20 34 40
2010Q4 19 30 35
2011Q1 19 27 33
2011Q2 18 26 31
2011Q3 18 24 29
2011Q4 17 24 28
2012Q1 17 23 27
2012Q2 17 23 27
2012Q3 17 22 26
2012Q4 17 22 26
By type of mortgage
Subprime ARMs 218 291 391
Subprime FRMs 87 110 134
Prime ARMs 119 173 264
Prime FRMs 126 175 234
Total, 2007–12 550 750 1,023
Source: Author’s calculations.
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home prices fall another 15 percent through the middle of 2009, the model
projects losses of $750 billion. Finally, if prices drop another 25 percent, pre-
dicted losses increase to $1.02 trillion. Moreover, the table suggests that
losses peak in the fourth quarter of 2008 if home prices drop another 5 per-
cent; in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 if prices drop another 15 percent; and in the
second quarter of 2009 if prices drop another 25 percent.
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The bottom panel in table 3 reports total estimated losses in the above
three home price scenarios for each type of mortgage. In the central sce-
nario (home prices fall by 15 percent), the model implies that losses of
$402 billion (with rounding), or just over half of all losses, will occur in the
subprime sector. As it happens, this corresponds roughly to the subprime
losses currently implied by prices of the ABX.HE family of subprime credit
derivatives.
21 One could interpret this as saying that the market is currently
discounting an implicit further home price decline of just under 15 percent.
However, this statement is highly approximate because the ABX analysis
is based on the stock of mortgages currently outstanding, whereas my
analysis of the MBA foreclosure data is based on projected cumulative
foreclosures over the 2007–12 period.
The Link between Credit Losses and Lending
The main reason why credit losses are important from a macroeconomic
perspective is that they weigh on the supply of credit to nonﬁnancial bor-
rowers. In this section I use the mortgage credit loss estimates of the previ-
ous section to quantify this link.
I start by documenting the facts about credit extension. About half of
the nearly $50 trillion in total credit extended by U.S.-based entities con-
sists of liabilities by domestic nonﬁnancial private borrowers; the rest is
mainly ﬁnancial and government debt. I focus here on the availability of
credit to private nonﬁnancial borrowers because it is likely to have the
most direct effect on overall economic activity.
22
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20. Losses are dated as of the foreclosure start, since this usually coincides roughly with
the booking of a loss by the lender. If the date of foreclosure sale were used instead, the
peaks would occur roughly two quarters later.
21. According to the model developed in Goldman Sachs (2007), the ABX.HE market
was discounting total subprime losses of $388.5 billion as of November 3, 2008.
22. Reduced availability of ﬁnancial credit may be important indirectly, but such an
effect would usually work by way of a tightening of nonﬁnancial lending conditions. A
reduction in credit availability to government borrowers is unlikely except in extreme cases.
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accounts as well as my own assumptions and interpolations, one can divide
this debt into ﬁve main categories (ﬁgure 4):
—On-balance-sheet lending by leveraged private entities ($10.8 trillion
as of the second quarter of 2008). These include banks, broker-dealers,
savings institutions, and ﬁnance companies. The largest categories are
residential and commercial mortgages held on balance sheet, followed by
other bank loans and consumer credit held on balance sheet. (This mea-
sure of on-balance-sheet lending does not include GSE-backed mortgage-
backed securities, or MBSs, for which the credit risk ultimately resides
with a government agency.)
—Lending in the ABS markets ($2.9 trillion). This category mostly con-
sists of nonconforming mortgage-backed securities, but it also includes
securities backed by consumer credit and corporate loans. This figure
excludes ABSs held on the balance sheets of leveraged institutions.
—Debt owned or guaranteed by a GSE ($5.5 trillion). This category
consists almost entirely of the mortgage books of business of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, which include mortgages or MBSs on their balance
sheets as well as MBSs for which those institutions bear the credit risk. I
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Figure 4. Outstanding Debt of Private Nonﬁnancial Borrowers, Second Quarter 2008
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GSEs bear the credit risk.
—Lending in the corporate bond and commercial paper markets
($3.9 trillion). This ﬁgure again excludes assets held on the balance sheets
of leveraged institutions.
—Direct lending and holdings of securities by unleveraged entities
($1.7 trillion). These include insurance companies, pension funds, and the
government.
Figure 5 shows total private nonﬁnancial credit growth and its ﬁve com-
ponents since 1991. Overall credit has grown at a compound annual rate of
7.1 percent, signiﬁcantly faster than the 5.3 percent annual growth rate of
nominal GDP over that period. By far the biggest contributor has been on-
balance-sheet credit growth, which has contributed 2.7 percentage points,
followed by GSE lending with 1.8 percentage points, corporate bonds with
1.2 percentage points, and the ABS markets with 1.1 percentage points.
However, the relative contributions of these different sectors have
changed sharply over time. During the credit boom of the 2004–07 period,
the surge in the private-label securitization markets contributed as much
as 2.5 percentage points to overall credit growth. Since the start of the
bust in mid-2008, however, this picture has changed dramatically, as the
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Figure 5. Accounting for Growth in Nonﬁnancial Private Credit, 1991–2008
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overall credit growth. In contrast, GSE-backed lending has accelerated
sharply over the past year. During the boom, GSE-backed lending con-
tributed 1.0 percentage point to credit growth, but since the bust started
this number has increased to 3.1 percentage points. This acceleration has
come despite the deterioration in the finances of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac over that period.
Of particular interest in assessing the impact of the credit crisis are
the ﬁrst three sectors: leveraged institutions, private-label ABS markets,
and the GSEs. The next subsection discusses the likely behavior of each of
these in turn.
The Behavior of Leveraged Financial Institutions
The ﬁrst shock to the supply of credit occurs through declining equity
capital and declining leverage among financial institutions, including
commercial banks, broker-dealers, savings institutions, credit unions, and
ﬁnance companies. In what follows I refer to this entire group of leveraged
institutions simply as “banks.”
There are three key ingredients in this story, which follows GHKS in
several important respects. First, the losses and writedowns cut into banks’
equity capital base, despite offsets to these losses from recapitalization as
well as lower corporate income taxes.
23 Second, the impact is magniﬁed
because banks appear to target a procyclical leverage ratio over the busi-
ness cycle. This can be explained in terms of value-at-risk models that
measure the approximate maximum daily loss (“approximate” in the sense
that anything worse than this loss can only happen with some benchmark
probability). Third, the impact of the ﬁrst two factors on end-user credit—
households and nonﬁnancial businesses—is dampened because some of
the lost credit supply consists of claims on other banks.
To get an estimate of the impact on credit supply, one can summarize
this story by means of the following equations:
() , 2d d YA Y A =×
() 11 dd AC k t LL A =− × − − ( ) × [] +× ( )
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23. The analysis of the offsets in this paper focuses only on private sector recapitaliza-
tion. Government equity injections are discussed as part of the policy response in the ﬁnal
section.
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sheet), Y is end-user credit (lending to private nonﬁnancial entities), C is
the pre-tax credit loss suffered by banks, k is the percentage of pre-tax
credit losses that is replaced by raising capital, t is the effective marginal
corporate income tax rate, and L is leverage. To derive a benchmark for the
contraction in total assets and nonﬁnancial private credit, I use the follow-
ing numbers for the variables in equations 1 and 2:
Bank credit loss (C) $762 billion
Tax offset (t) 25 percent
Private recapitalization rate (k) 50 percent
Change in leverage (dL) −10 percent
End-user credit ratio (Y/A) 63 percent.
I explain each of these assumptions in turn.
BANK CREDIT LOSS. For my illustrative calculation, I assume that home
prices fall by another 15 percent (logarithmically) from mid-2008 to mid-
2009, which, according to the model developed in the previous section,
should result in a total credit loss on residential mortgages of $750 billion.
I assume that U.S. banks ultimately suffer 60 percent of this loss, or
$450 billion. Table 4 summarizes credit losses realized since the crisis
began in the summer of 2007. Over the past year, ﬁnancial institutions
globally have written down or provisioned for a total of $840 billion
because of the credit crisis, mostly because of residential mortgages. (This
ﬁgure includes about $100 billion of equity capital lost in failed ﬁnancial
institutions.) U.S. commercial banks and investment banks account for
$497 billion (59 percent) of this total. My assumption that U.S. banks will
bear 60 percent of the ultimate loss simply reﬂects their share in losses rec-
ognized to date.
In addition to the assumed $450 billion in residential mortgage credit
losses, banks are starting to see larger credit losses on other types of loans
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Table 4. Worldwide Credit Losses by Type of Financial Institution since Mid-2007a
Billions of dollars
Type of institution United States Europe Rest of world Total
Investment banks 126.3 78.7 0.9 205.9
Commercial banks 370.3 112.4 14.2 496.9
Specialty ﬁnance 91.6 . . . . . . 91.6
Insurance and asset 38.8 6.6 . . . 45.4
management ﬁrms
Total 627.0 191.7 15.1 839.8
Sources: Company releases, Goldman Sachs Research.
a. Losses include writedowns, above-trend provisions, and equity in failed institutions.
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porate these into the analysis, I use the estimates provided by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF).
24 Speciﬁcally, I use the midpoint of the
IMF’s ranges for bank losses on loans and securities exposures other than
residential mortgages, residential MBSs, and residential ABS collateral-
ized debt obligations. For loans, I assume that all bank losses are incurred
by U.S. institutions; for securities, I assume that 60 percent of all bank
losses are incurred by U.S. institutions. This results in additional estimated
losses and writedowns for U.S. banks of $312 billion, for a total estimated
loss, including residential mortgages, of $762 billion.
TAX OFFSET. The after-tax credit loss is likely to be lower than the pre-
tax loss because most banks will be able to use their credit losses to lower
their corporate income tax liability. However, the offset is likely to be
below the statutory 35 percent corporate income tax rate. Banks that make
losses for many years—or end up going out of business—will be unable to
obtain this offset. Taking this into account, I assume that the average effec-
tive marginal tax rate offset is 25 percent.
PRIVATE RECAPITALIZATION RATE. So far during the crisis, U.S. commer-
cial and investment banks have raised about 65 percent of the total pre-tax
credit loss in new equity capital. More recently, however, the pace
of private recapitalization has slowed as the crisis has intensiﬁed. I there-
fore assume a somewhat smaller ultimate private recapitalization ratio of
50 percent, in line with the central assumption in GHKS.
CHANGE IN LEVERAGE. GHKS show that leverage by commercial and
investment banks is procyclical, rising in booms and declining in slumps.
However, their paper does not provide much guidance with respect to the
size of the potential leverage decline during the current crisis. To obtain a
quantitative estimate, I therefore look at two other pieces of evidence: the
history of the early 1990s, and recent disclosures by U.S. banks of changes
in their balance sheet targets.
Figure 6 plots the aggregate leverage ratio of U.S. banks (both commer-
cial and investment banks) since 1990.
25 It shows that leverage declined by
28 percent (from 17.0 to 12.3) in the four years from 1990 to 1994. If this
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24. IMF (2008).
25. I deﬁne leverage as total assets divided by equity capital. The series is calculated
from quarterly ﬁnancial reports on the assets and equity capital of ﬁrms included in the
following S&P 500 sectors: diversiﬁed banks (GICS code 40101010), regional banks
(40101015), other diversiﬁed ﬁnancial services (40201020), and investment banking and
brokerage (40203020). The series is adjusted for two series breaks in June 2003 and April
2005.
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amount of deleveraging. However, the ﬁgure also shows that leverage in
the banking system is now lower than it was in 1990. This suggests that the
decline in leverage among banks could be a bit more muted.
26 Hence, I
assume a decline in overall bank leverage of 10 percent, while acknowl-
edging that the uncertainty about target leverage is sizable and that the
risks are probably tilted in the direction of a larger decline.
27
END-USER CREDIT RATIO. In the dataset for this paper, the ratio of end-
user credit to total bank assets is 63 percent, calculated simply as the
ratio of private nonfinancial credit to the total size of the unconsolidated
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26. The analysis in this section excludes off-balance-sheet vehicles. However, the
shrinkage of the off-balance-sheet ABS markets is discussed below.
27. In terms of the leverage ratio, I rely on the estimates in exhibit 4.5 in GHKS, rather
than the bottom-up data in ﬁgure 6. Although the bottom-up data are suitable for assessing
changes over time, they include S&P 500 ﬁrms only and exclude both ﬁnance companies
and most savings institutions and are therefore considerably less comprehensive. When
adjusted for the exclusion of the GSEs and imputed hedge fund ﬁgures from the leveraged
sector, the GHKS data imply an aggregate leverage ratio of 10.9.
Sources: Standard & Poor’s and author’s calculations.
a. Data cover both commercial and investment banks.
Ratio of assets to equity
13





Figure 6. Bank Leverage Ratios, 1990–2008
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28. Deutsche Bank (2008).
bank balance sheet. This is larger than the 42.7 percent share used in
GHKS, which was estimated indirectly (and for a somewhat different set
of institutions) from various accounting relationships in the U.S. banking
sector. However, the 63 percent figure is similar to that reported in the
recent study by Deutsche Bank, which estimates an end-user credit share
of 67 percent for the European banking system.
28
Armed with these assumptions, I can calculate benchmark ﬁgures for
dA and dY as follows:
dA = [−$762 billion × (1 − 0.50 − 0.25) × 10.9] − (0.1 × $17.3 trillion) =
−$3.81 trillion
dY =− $3.81 trillion × 0.63 =− $2.40 trillion.
Thus, the above assumptions imply that banks could reduce the supply
of credit to end users by $2.4 trillion in response to credit losses and the
change in their desired leverage ratios. This number is more than twice
the $1 trillion estimate in GHKS, for three main reasons. First, partly
because of more adverse mortgage credit loss assumptions, and partly
because I also consider nonmortgage credit losses, I assume considerably
larger total credit losses for banks, although this difference is partly off-
set by the assumption that banks will use 25 percent of their losses to
reduce their income tax liability. Second, I consider a decline in leverage
of 10 percent rather than 5 percent. Third, I assume a larger end-user
credit share.
One very important question is the time horizon over which the adjust-
ment takes place. For purposes of quantifying the impact on real GDP
growth, I assume that the impact occurs over a two-year period. This is
based on the assumption that banks started to respond to the credit crisis in
mid- to late 2007 and will have completed their response by mid- to late
2009, when home prices are assumed to bottom. Under this assumption,
the combined effects of the losses and the deleveraging would subtract
$1.2 trillion from the annualized flow supply of end-user bank credit, rel-
ative to a baseline scenario in which there is no housing and credit crisis.
In this baseline scenario, the most natural assumption is continued bank
lending growth that matches the trend annual growth rate of nominal GDP
of about 5 percent. Since this implies baseline bank lending of about
$500 billion a year (calculated as 5 percent × $10.9 trillion), these calcula-
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29. In apparent contrast to predictions of a credit slowdown, the Federal Reserve’s
weekly commercial bank balance sheet data point to a sharp pickup in bank credit growth
since early September 2008. I believe that this pickup reﬂects a substantial increase in the
demand for bank credit as other ﬁnancing sources have dried up, and is therefore demand-
rather than supply-driven. For example, a number of corporate borrowers have reportedly
been shut out of the commercial paper markets and have therefore tapped backup credit
lines. Despite the pickup in credit outstanding, the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Ofﬁcers’
survey for 2008Q4 shows a clear increase in lending restraint by banks, consistent with the
predictions of this analysis.
tions imply an annualized shrinkage in the absolute ﬂow supply of end-
user bank credit of $700 billion during the crisis.
29
ABS Market Disruptions
The second disruption to the supply of credit occurs through the ABS
markets. The recent mortgage credit losses have brought the originate-and-
distribute model underlying these markets into serious disrepute. That
model is based on the idea that the bundling and structuring of small
loans—most commonly residential or commercial mortgages, but also
credit card debt, student loans, and a host of other loans—combined with
an opinion from the major rating agencies can produce securities with risk
characteristics comparable to those of traditional corporate bonds. How-
ever, the much higher than expected losses on these securities, especially
subprime mortgage securities, have badly dented the reputation of the rat-
ing agencies and undermined the willingness of investors to purchase such
securitized products from the ﬁnancial institutions that bundle them. With-
out a respected third-party institution to assess the credit quality of ABSs,
the model has broken down. As a result, gross issuance has fallen sharply.
Figure 7 shows the impact of this disruption on overall credit creation.
It plots gross issuance of securitized nonconforming residential mort-
gages, commercial mortgages, credit cards, and automobile and student
loans since early 2006, as well as the measure of net lending through the
ABS markets discussed above. As gross issuance has fallen from around
$1.3 trillion (annualized) in 2006 and the ﬁrst half of 2007 to only around
$500 billion (annualized) in the second half of 2007 and the ﬁrst half of
2008, net credit extension through off-balance-sheet ABSs has swung
from an average of around +$600 billion to −$300 billion. Hence, it appears
that most of the drop in gross issuance has translated into a drop in net
credit extension.
It is unlikely that ABS issuance will rebound until investors regain con-
ﬁdence in their ability to evaluate ABS credit quality. This could happen in
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despite their failure to foresee the massive mortgage credit losses, or
investors and issuers come up with alternative methods of monitoring
credit quality in the ABS market. Neither development looks imminent,
and so it is likely that gross ABS issuance will remain extremely low and
net ABS issuance sharply negative. I therefore assume that net credit
extension through the ABS markets will average −$400 billion (annual-
ized) in 2008 and 2009. Relative to a counterfactual trend of +$125 billion
(+5 percent of the outstanding stock of ABSs), this implies an impact of
−$525 billion.
The Behavior of Government-Sponsored Enterprises
The GHKS analysis includes the activity of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac with that of other leveraged ﬁnancial institutions. This seemed rea-
sonable at the time because the GSEs are clearly among the most highly
leveraged institutions in the U.S. ﬁnancial system, and because they are
more directly exposed to the housing market than any other. Now that the
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 
Bloomberg.
a. Sum of preceding four quarters.
Trillions of dollarsa
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Figure 7. Issuance of Asset-Backed Securities, 2007–08
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however, they clearly need to be analyzed separately.
From the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis in August 2007 until about
May 2008, the GSEs behaved very differently from other private ﬁnancial
institutions. As shown in ﬁgure 8, the GSEs grew their books of business at
rates of up to 15 percent and provided a major offset to the tightening in
the fully private ﬁnancial sector. However, starting in June 2008, growth
slowed sharply as the GSEs started to focus on capital preservation. The
Treasury Department’s decision in early September 2008 to take the GSEs
into conservatorship raises the likelihood of a renewed pickup in growth.
The present analysis assumes that the annualized contribution of the GSEs
to overall credit growth will average $500 billion, or about 10 percent.
Implications for Overall Credit Supply
To sum up the discussion, table 5 shows my rough estimates of the net
impact from the three sectors on the supply of nonﬁnancial private credit.
This is done by adding up the estimated annualized reduction in the supply
of bank credit, the annualized change in off-balance-sheet private-label
ABSs relative to a counterfactual assumption of 5 percent annual growth,
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Sources: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae.
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Figure 8. Changes in GSEs’ Mortgage Book of Business, 2004–08
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factual assumption of 5 percent growth. These numbers sum to a total
drag on nonfinancial private lending of $1.47 trillion, equivalent to a
6.0-percentage-point drag on the growth rate of private nonﬁnancial debt.
This is almost entirely due to the restraint on bank balance sheet growth
from credit losses net of recapitalization and falling leverage.
The Link between Lending and Aggregate Economic Activity
To complete the analysis, I turn to the link between the supply of credit
and aggregate economic activity. The effects of the credit losses on banks
and off-balance-sheet ABS markets have led to a reduction in overall 
balance sheet capacity and therefore in the supply of credit to the real
economy. A simple way to gauge the importance of this effect is to relate
the volume of credit outstanding to a measure of cyclical ﬂuctuation in
overall economic activity, such as the growth rate of real GDP. However,
since the causality between credit and economic activity clearly runs in
both directions, it is important to look for instrumental variables that can
be used to isolate the impact of an exogenous change in credit on activ-
ity. I use two survey measures of credit availability as instruments. The
first is the perceived availability of credit to small businesses, as mea-
sured in the monthly survey of the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB), and the second is the willingness of banks to extend
consumer installment loans, as measured in the Federal Reserve’s Senior
Loan Officers’ (SLO) survey.
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Table 5. Projected Change in Credit Supply by Type of Financial Institution, 2008–09
Billions of dollars
Change in Trend credit Total change
credit from growth at in credit
Type of institution end-2007 5 percent a year supply
Banks and other leveraged ﬁnancial  −1,199
institutions
a
Asset-backed securities markets −400 +125 −525
Government-sponsored enterprises +500 +250 +250
Total −1,474
Memorandum: change in credit as  −6.0
percent of total credit outstanding
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Includes commercial banks, broker-dealers, savings institutions, credit unions, and finance
companies.
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endogeneity problem, there is also the risk that a tightening of credit avail-
ability may be due to a deterioration in the economy, which would ren-
der the instruments invalid.
30 The ﬁrst-stage equation therefore uses only
instruments lagged by two quarters or more. Even this does not entirely
rule out endogeneity problems if banks are systematically able to predict a
deterioration in the economy two quarters or more in the future and adjust
their credit standards accordingly. Whether banks can do this, however, is
open to question. The fact that the housing and credit crisis apparently
caught many banks by surprise raises serious questions about their ability
to forecast broader economic and market developments and reduces the
concern about endogeneity in this analysis.
I start with a simple ordinary least squares regression of real GDP
growth on real private domestic nonﬁnancial debt (PDNFD) growth, using
quarterly data from 1974Q4 through 2008Q1:
where dGDP is the annualized log change in real GDP, dPDNFD is the
annualized log difference of real credit, and Newey-West t statistics are
given in parentheses below the regression coefﬁcients. SE is the standard
error or the regression, and D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic. There
clearly is a reasonably strong correlation between credit growth and GDP
growth, very much as expected.
Turning to the IV results, I start by presenting the results from an auxil-
iary ﬁrst-stage regression of credit on the lagged survey variables:
where NFIB2 to 4 is the average percentage of small businesses indicating
in the NFIB survey that credit was harder to get from lags 2 to 4, and
SLO2 to 3 is the average net percentage of banks reporting in the SLO sur-
vey an increased willingness to make consumer installment loans (season-
ally adjusted using the Census X-12 algorithm) from lags 2 to 3. These
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30. Mishkin (2008).
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credit growth.
Next, the second-stage IV regression is given by
where dGDP is the annualized log difference of real GDP. The equation
implies that a supply-driven 1-percentage-point slowdown in real credit
growth is associated with a 0.44-percentage-point slowdown in real GDP
growth. This estimate is very similar to the results reported by GHKS, who
estimate that a 1-percentage-point slowdown in credit growth lowers real
GDP growth by 0.34 percentage point in the short run and 0.47 percentage
point in the long run.
These regression results can be combined with the calculations in the
prior section to estimate the approximate impact of the credit supply dete-
rioration on economic activity. Recall that the estimate of supply-driven
drag on credit growth was 6.0 percentage points per year. According to the
IV estimates, this implies a drag on real GDP growth of 2.6 percentage
points per year for a two-year period.
The above estimates should be interpreted as the shock to aggregate
demand from the balance sheet tightening brought about by the increase in
mortgage credit losses. The ultimate deviation of real GDP growth from
trend could be larger or smaller than this estimate. It could be larger if
there are substantial multiplier effects that amplify the initial shock. These
multipliers could work through a deterioration in the labor market, a down-
turn in nonﬁnancial business investment in response to the original shock,
or a U.S.-induced global economic slowdown that washes back onto U.S.
shores through effects on international trade and investment. It could be
smaller if economic policymakers react to the shock in a timely manner by
cutting interest rates and loosening ﬁscal policy. In addition, the large-
scale equity injections into the ﬁnancial sector by the Treasury through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) have the potential to offset a sig-
niﬁcant part of the shock from reduced bank lending.
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper confirms that the decline in home prices and
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11472-04_Hatzius_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:29 PM  Page 225driver of the economic downturn through the disruptions in the ﬁnancial
system they have caused. These disruptions result not just from the impact
of the losses on the lending capacity of banks, as emphasized by GHKS,
but also from the sharp swing from positive into negative territory of net
lending in the private-label ABS markets.
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that measures to boost
the supply of credit are promising tools for softening the current economic
downturn. One such measure is the $700 billion recapitalization of the
ﬁnancial system being undertaken by the Treasury Department through
TARP. As of early November 2008, the Treasury had committed $250 bil-
lion in government capital injections into ﬁnancial institutions through this
program. Further injections could significantly soften the current credit
squeeze.
Another possibility is to step up the supply of credit through Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. The baseline assumption of this paper is that the
GSEs will grow their book of business by 10 percent (at an annualized
rate), or about $500 billion. This assumption is actually slightly more opti-
mistic than the pace seen in the six months through September 2008, when
the aggregate book of business grew by only 6.3 percent annualized. How-
ever, now that the Treasury essentially controls Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, it could signiﬁcantly boost the growth rate. The analysis in this paper
implies that this would also soften the impact of the squeeze in the banking
system and the ABS markets.
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